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politique dans l’Antiquité selon les écoles ou courants philosophiques majeurs, à 
l’exception notable des épicuriens. Certaines de ces contributions mériteraient une note 
critique plus développée.  L’ouvrage quant à lui s’adresse assurément à tous ceux auxquels 
les liens entre philosophie et politique antiques importent.
Juliette Lemaire
Centre Jean Pépin UMR8230 CNRS-ENS-PSL
Gwenaëlle Aubry, Genèse du Dieu souverain. Archéologie de la puissance II. Paris, 
Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2018 (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), 
320 p., ISBN 978-2-7116-2806-3.
The present volume is the successor to Dieu sans la puissance. Dunamis et energeia chez 
Aristote et chez Plotin (Paris, Vrin, 2006). In that book, the author examines Aristotelian 
metaphysics as an ontology of act-potency (energeia-dunamis). Her conclusion is that 
the act that is the life of the unmoved mover is pure or complete actualization, which 
means that it has no further actualizations. In that case, the effect of the unmoved mover 
as first principle of all can only be as an ideal that is imitated by beings that can imitate 
it. She contrasts Aristotle’s account of act as first principle with that of Plotinus who, 
following Plato, makes the first principle of all dunamis tōn pantōn, where dunamis must 
be understood as power, not potency.
In the book considered here, Aubry continues her examination of how the Platonic-
Aristotelian background is developed within the Christian theology of the Middle Ages. 
She covers a vast amount of material, including Augustine, Peter Damian and Peter 
Abelard, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus.  Her aim is to show how 
the all-powerful or omnipotent God of Christianity arises out of the Aristotelian pure 
act and how Christian philosophers worked out the idea of the all-powerful as an agent 
(p. 13). In the course of her introduction to the main body of expository chapters, Aubry 
presents a concise survey of the many problems surrounding the adaptation of Platonic-
Aristotelian metaphysics to the exigencies of Christian theology. Above all, assuming 
that God is omnipotent in some sense, he then has an unlimited will, for any limitation 
on that will would imply a limitation on omnipotence. Aubry contrasts “puissance de 
tout” (dunamis pantōn) with “toute-puissance,” where the former is constrained at least 
by the good and the latter is not. The theology of a God who is omnipotent faces the 
problem of evil, although this is clearly also a problem for a theology of “puissance de 
tout.”  As Aubry acutely observes, the problem of the compatibility of omnipotence with 
other attributes of the divine—especially goodness—is independent of the problems of 
theodicy, even if the latter is ultimately derived from the former (p. 16).  In addition, 
the problem of human freedom inevitably arises if God is truly omnipotent (p. 22). The 
concept of an omnipotent God is further distinguished from that of the Pantokrator, 
the God of potentia ordinata rather than potentia absoluta (p.  27). The Pantokrator is 
constrained by the good, even if this constraint is not viewed negatively; the omnipotent 
God is constrained by nothing. But this fact opens the way to a myriad of theological and 
philosophical issues.
The first chapter focuses on Augustine who, apart from Origen, is probably the first 
to try to bring together the God of scripture and the Platonic heritage. Three points 
stand out in Aubry’s account. First, Augustine refuses to make goodness a criterion 
independent of God’s omnipotence. How the apparently evil is nevertheless good must 
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remain a mystery (p. 38, 56). Second, Augustine argues that God’s omnipotence is in fact 
limited by the possible. Thus, God’s omnipotence entails that he is Pantokrator (p. 57-59). 
Third, against Pelagius, Augustine argues that human freedom does not obviate the need 
for divine grace. That is, the logical possibility that a free person should do good, does 
not mean that he has the power to do so (p. 80).
The second chapter explores the dialectical opposition of Peter Damian and Peter 
Abelard regarding divine omnipotence. According to Damian, God’s omnipotence 
exceeds even a putative limitation by the principle of non-contradiction, which Damian 
reduces to a contingent law of nature (p. 113).  According to Abelard, God can only do 
what he in fact does. Thus, omnipotence is not the power to do more than God wants, 
but just what he does want (p. 126). In this view, God is omnipotent in the way that the 
Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus is omnipotent: constrained by necessity. For Abelard, the 
actual world is not just the best possible world, but the only possible world (p.  133). 
Crucially, Abelard inserts into the account of omnipotence the distinction between 
necessity de dicto or de sensu and necessity de re. It is possible (de re) that God should 
save someone, but it is not possible that God should save someone who deserves to be 
damned (p. 137). Thus, the meaning of possible is different for God and for humans. 
For God, whatever is possible is necessary, owing to God’s omnipotence; for humans, 
the possible means being open to contraries, such as the one who is damned eventually 
repenting (p. 139). 
The third chapter considers Peter Lombard and his opposition to Abelard and 
defense of Augustine. The central tenet of this opposition is Lombard’s unwillingness 
to identify divine will and divine omnipotence (p. 145).  Thus, God is able to do more 
than or other than what in fact he does. This claim is based on the distinction between 
“puissance absolue” (potentia absoluta) and “puissance ordinée” (potentia conditionalis, 
later ordinata). For Lombard, and other followers of Augustine, and in opposition to 
Abelard, God does not do all that he is able to do. He rejects Abelard’s quod noluit 
minime possit by Augustine’s potuit sed noluit (p.  151). The only things impossible 
for God are those which are incompatible with his nature. The remainder of this 
chapter (p.  150-174) surveys the ways in which the above distinction is incorporated 
into theological reflection over the next hundred years or so. This theological debate 
culminates in the condemnation of 1277, which endorses essentially the Augustinian 
position by identifying God’s omnipotence with his autonomy. This is autonomy from 
creation or what is ordinata, and from secondary causes, but not from internal logical and 
axiological constraints. 
The fourth and fifth chapters are, appropriately enough, the richest philosophically, 
since they concern Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. The fourth chapter traces the 
Thomistic innovation of actus essendi, according to which Aristotelian act (energeia) 
is no longer ultimate, but is itself in potency to esse. Thus, act is receptive of and a 
limitation on esse (p. 178-179). So, showing that the first principle of all is ipsum esse 
frees Aquinas from the limitation that Aristotle imposes on the first by making it 
energeia. Aubry recognizes that, as ipsum esse, God is virtually (virtualiter) all things. 
Thus, Aquinas draws on the Platonic tradition, according to which the first principle of 
all is “virtually all things” (dunamis pantōn) (p. 183). That the first has this “power” is 
exactly why Plato identifies the first as “the Good” which is essentially “overflowing”. The 
Scholastic bonum est diffusivum sui formulates this postulate, whether or not it is paired 
with Thomistic existentialism. So, against Aristotle, act becomes identified with power. 
Aquinas endorses the Aristotelian conclusion that the first principle is a final cause, but 
only because it is also the first efficient cause (p. 192). Thus, Aquinas sets his renovated 
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Aristotelian metaphysics within the context of the Platonic spiritual cycle of “stability” 
(monē), “procession” (proodos) and “reversion” (epistrophē). And God’s omnipotence is 
identified with his nature understood as pure actus essendi and is unlimited in any way, 
since actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam (p. 206). Crucially, this means that there can 
be no real relation between God and creatures, since all real relations require that the 
relata be substances or composites of act and potency.
The chapter on Duns Scotus sets the problem of omnipotence within the refined 
Scotistic distinction of necessity and contingency (p.  231). Most important, Scotus 
transfers the notion of contingency from the realm of secondary causes to God.  Thus, 
the contingency of everything is the principal sign of God’s omnipotence. As Aubry 
nicely explains, the Scotistic account of synchronic contingency is essentially theological. 
That is, it is no longer located in finite being, in particular, in the capacity for alternative 
courses of action, but in the divine will (p. 234-235). For us, contingencies are contraries 
that may or may not be realized diachronically; they cannot be actualized simultaneously. 
But for an eternal God, these contraries become contradictories, because God can will 
them eternally as possibilities. The actualization of either one is contingent, meaning that 
God does not act necessarily, even though God is a necessary being. The actualization of 
any existent or existent state of affairs is purely the result of God’s will. God can will a 
rock to be and not to be in eternity (p. 249). What in fact occurs is a result of God’s 
absolute, and absolutely inscrutable will. This is voluntarism with respect to creatures 
who are entirely the recipients of God’s effective will, but it is not voluntarism within the 
divine nature. That is, in God will is not prior to intellect or to the good (p. 254-263). 
Scotus thus collapses the distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata for 
God acts according to his own will only (p. 270). 
There is a brief but provocative conclusion in which Aubry asks what is the 
contemporary effect of medieval accounts of omnipotence (p.  273). Her answer is 
that divine omnipotence has been secularized as the absolute power of the State and 
has morphed into legitimized State-sponsored violence. Her all-too-brief reflections on 
the relation of theology and philosophy to politics raise some interesting questions not 
the least of which is whether the politics of post-Westphalia Europe can be realistically 
counted as an effect of Scholastic metaphysics. 
This book, like its predecessor, is filled with arresting insights and lucid expositions 
of highly complex material. The discerning reader will appreciate especially Aubry’s 
entirely justified assumption that ancient and medieval philosophy contain together one 
continuous and portentous discussion of the most weighty and challenging matters. Her 
connection of these, both in the introductory and concluding chapters, is a welcome 
bonus.
Lloyd P. Gerson
Universiy of Toronto
